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Soldiers of the State:
Reconsidering American
Civil-Military Relations
RICHARD D. HOOKER, JR.

I

n American academe today the dominant view of civil-military relations is
sternly critical of the military, asserting that civilian control of the military
is dangerously eroded.1 Though tension clearly exists in the relationship, the
current critique is largely inaccurate and badly overwrought. Far from overstepping its bounds, America’s military operates comfortably within constitutional notions of separated powers, participating appropriately in defense
and national security policymaking with due deference to the principle of civilian control. Indeed, an active and vigorous role by the military in the policy
process is and always has been essential to the common defense.
A natural starting point for any inquiry into the state of civil-military
relations in the US today is to define what is meant by the terms “civil-military
relations” and “civilian control.” Broadly defined, “civil-military relations”
refers to the relationship between the armed forces of the state and the larger society they serve—how they communicate, how they interact, and how the interface between them is ordered and regulated. Similarly, “civilian control”
means simply the degree to which the military’s civilian masters can enforce
their authority on the military services.2
Clarifying the vocabulary of civil-military relations sheds an interesting light on the current, highly charged debate. The dominant academic
critique takes several forms, charging that the military has become increasingly estranged from the society it serves;3 that it has abandoned political neutrality for partisan politics;4 and that it plays an increasingly dominant and
illegitimate role in policymaking.5 This view contrasts the ideal of the nonpartisan, apolitical soldier with a different reality. In this construct, the mili4
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tary operates freely in a charged political environment to “impose its own
perspective” in defiance of the principle of civilian control.6 The critique is
frequently alarmist, employing terms like “ominous,”7 “alienated,”8 and “out
of control.”9 The debate is strikingly one-sided; few civilian or military leaders have publicly challenged the fundamental assumptions of the critics.10 Yet
as we shall see, the dominant scholarly view is badly flawed in its particulars,
expressing a distorted view of the military at work in a complex political system that distributes power widely.

The Civil-Military Gap
The common assertion that a “gap” exists which divides the military
and society in an unhealthy way is a central theme. Unquestionably, the military as an institution embraces and imposes a set of values that more narrowly
restricts individual behavior. But the evidence is strong that the public understands the necessity for more circumscribed personal rights and liberties in
the military, and accepts the rationale for an organizationally conservative
outlook that emphasizes the group over the individual and organizational success over personal validation.
The tension between the conservative requirements of military life
and the more liberal outlook of civil society goes far back before the Revolution to the early days of colonial America’s militia experience. Though it has
waxed and waned, it has remained central to the national conversation about
military service.11 The issue is an important one: the military holds an absolute monopoly on force in society, and how to keep it strong enough to defend
the state and subservient enough not to threaten it is the central question in
civil-military relations. Most commentators assume that this difference in
outlook poses a significant problem—that at best it is a condition to be managed, and at worst a positive danger to the state. As a nation, however, America has historically accepted the necessity for a military more highly ordered
and disciplined than civil society.
While important cultural differences exist between the services and
even between communities within the services,12 the military in general remains focused on a functional imperative that prizes success in war above all
else. Though sometimes degraded during times of lessened threat, this imperColonel Richard D. Hooker, Jr., graduated from the National War College in 2003
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ative has remained constant at least since the end of the Civil War and the rise
of modern military professionalism. It implies a set of behaviors and values
markedly different from those predominant in civil society, particularly in an
all-volunteer force less influenced by large numbers of temporary conscripts.
Though the primary function of the military is often described as
“the application of organized violence,” the military’s conservative and
group-centered bias is based on something even more fundamental. In the
combat forces which dominate the services, in ethos if not in numbers, the
first-order challenge is not to achieve victory on the battlefield. Rather it is to
make the combat soldier face his own mortality. Under combat conditions the
existence of risk cannot be separated from the execution of task. The military
culture, while broadly conforming to constitutional notions of individual
rights and liberties, therefore derives from the functional imperative and by
definition values collective over individual good.
The American public intuitively understands this, as evidenced by
polling data which demonstrate conclusively that a conservative military ethic
has not alienated the military from society.13 On the contrary, public confidence
in the military remains consistently high, more than a quarter century after the
end of the draft and the drawdown of the 1990s, both of which lessened the incidence and frequency of civilian participation in military affairs. There is even
reason to believe that the principal factors cited most often to explain the existence of the “gap”—namely the supposed isolation of the military from civilian
communities and the gulf between civilian and military values—have been
greatly exaggerated.
The military “presence” in civil society is not confined to serving
members of the active-duty military. Rather, it encompasses all who serve or
have served, active and reserve. For example, millions of veterans with firsthand knowledge of the military and its value system exist within the population
at large. The high incidence of married service members and an increasing
trend toward off-base housing mean that hundreds of thousands of military
people and their dependents live in the civilian community. Reserve component installations and facilities and the reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines who serve there bring the military face to face with society every day
in thousands of local communities across the country. Commissioned officers,
and increasingly noncommissioned officers (NCOs), regularly participate in
civilian educational programs, and officer training programs staffed by active,
reserve, and retired military personnel are found on thousands of college and
high school campuses. Military recruiting offices are located in every sizable
city and town. Many military members even hold second jobs in the private
sector. At least among middle-class and working-class Americans, the military
is widely represented and a part of everyday life.14
6
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Just as the military’s isolation from society is often overstated, differences in social attitudes, while clearly present, do not place the military
outside the mainstream of American life. The dangers posed by a “values
gap” are highly questionable given the wide disparity in political perspectives found between the east and west coasts and the American “heartland”;
between urban, suburban, and rural populations; between north and south;
between different religious and ethnic communities; and between social and
economic classes. It may well be true that civil society is more forgiving than
the military for personal failings like personal dishonesty, adultery, indebtedness, assault, or substance abuse. But society as a whole does not condone
these behaviors or adopt a neutral view. To the extent that there are differences, they are differences of degree. On fundamental questions about the
rule of law, on the equality of persons, on individual rights and liberties, and
on civilian control of the military in our constitutional system, there are no
sharp disagreements with the larger society. Indeed, there is general agreement about what constitutes right and wrong behavior.15 The difference lies
chiefly in how these ideals of “right behavior” are enforced. Driven by the
functional imperative of battlefield success, the military as an institution
views violations of publicly accepted standards of behavior more seriously
because they threaten the unity, cohesion, or survival of the group.16 Seen in
this light, the values “gap” assumes a very different character.
To be sure, sweeping events have altered the civil-military compact.
The advent of the all-volunteer force, the defeat in Vietnam, the end of the Cold
War, the drawdown of the 1990s, the impact of gender and sexual orientation
policies, and a host of other factors have influenced civil-military relations in
important ways. The polity no longer sees military service as a requirement of
citizenship during periods of national crisis, or a large standing military as a
wartime anomaly. Despite such fundamental changes, over time public support
for the military and its values has remained surprisingly enduring, even as the
level of public participation in military affairs has declined.

The “Politicization” of the Military
Of equal or perhaps greater import is the charge that the military has
abandoned its tradition of nonpartisan service to the state in favor of partisan
politics. Based on apparently credible evidence that the military has embraced conservatism as a political philosophy and affiliated with the Republican Party, this view implies a renunciation of the classical, archetypal soldier
who neither voted nor cared about partisan politics. Nevertheless, as with the
“values gap,” the charge that the US military has become dangerously politicized does not stand up to closer scrutiny. The tradition of nonpartisanship is
alive and well in America’s military.
Winter 2003-04
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“Though tension clearly exists in the relationship,
the current critique is largely inaccurate
and badly overwrought.”

One can plausibly speculate on trends which suggest greater Republican affiliation over the past generation or so. Seven of the last ten presidential administrations have been Republican. For those with a propensity to
enter the military and even more for those who choose to stay, the Republican
Party is generally seen as more supportive of military pay, quality of life, and
a strong defense. Since the late 1970s, the percentage of young Americans
identifying themselves as Republicans rose significantly across the board.
Still, from 1976 to 1999, the number of high school seniors expecting to enter the military and self-identifying as Republicans never exceeded
40 percent and actually declined significantly from 1991 to 1999. Despite the
end of the draft and the more market-inspired and occupational flavor of military service under the all-volunteer concept, new recruits “are predominantly
not Republican and are less Republican than their peers who go to college.”17
Increasingly it seems clear that the young enlisted service members who
make up a large proportion of the force cannot be characterized as predominantly conservative or Republican.
The figures for senior military officers are quite different; about two
thirds self-identify as Republican. To some extent this reflects the attitudes
of the socio-economic cohort they are drawn from, generally defined as nonminority, college educated, belonging to mainstream Christian denominations,
and above average in income. On the other hand, military elites overwhelmingly shun the “far-right” or “extremely conservative” labels, are far less supportive of fundamentalist religious views, and are significantly more liberal
than mainstream society as a whole on social issues.18 It is far more accurate to
say that senior military leaders occupy the political center than to portray them
as creatures of the right.
If the conservative orientation of the military is less clear-cut than
commonly supposed, its actual impact on American electoral politics is
highly doubtful. As we have seen, the attitudes and orientation of the enlisted
force vary considerably. The commissioned officer corps, comprising perhaps ten percent of the force (roughly 120,000 active-duty members) and
only a tiny fraction of the electorate, is not in any sense politically active. It
8
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does not proselytize among its subordinates, organize politically, contribute
financially to campaigns to any significant degree or, apparently, vote in
large numbers. There is no real evidence that the military has become increasingly partisan in an electoral sense, or that it plays an important role in election outcomes. As Lance Betros has argued,
The fundamental weakness of this argument is that it ascribes to military voters
a level of partisanship that is uncharacteristic of the voting public. The vast majority of people who cast votes for Democrats or Republicans are not partisans,
in the sense of actively advancing the party’s interests. Instead, they comprise
the “party in the electorate,” a much looser affiliation than the party organization. . . . [T]hese voters do not have more than a casual involvement in the
party’s organizational affairs and rarely interact with political leaders and activists. They are, in effect, the consumers, not the purveyors, of the party’s partisan appeals and policies.19

A common criticism is that a growing tendency by retired military
elites to publicly campaign for specific candidates signals an alarming move
away from the tradition of nonpartisanship. But aside from the fact that this
trend can be observed in favor of both parties,20 not just the Republicans, evidence that documents the practical effect of these endorsements is lacking.
Except in wartime, most voters cannot even identify the nation’s past or present military leaders. They are unlikely to be swayed by their endorsements.
Nor is there any evidence that the political actions of retired generals and admirals unduly influence the electoral or policy preferences of the active-duty
military. We are in fact a far cry from the days when senior military leaders actually contended for the presidency while on active duty—a far more serious
breach of civilian control.

The Military Role in the Policy Process
More current is the suggestion that party affiliation lends itself to
military resistance to civilian control in policy matters, especially during periods of Democratic control. The strongest criticism in this vein is directed at
General Colin Powell as a personality and gays in the military as a policy issue, with any number of prominent scholars drawing overarching inferences
about civil-military relations from this specific event.21 This tendency to
draw broad conclusions from a specific case is prevalent in the field but
highly questionable as a matter of scholarship. The record of military deference to civilian control, particularly in the recent past, in fact supports a quite
different conclusion.
Time and again in the past decade, military policy preferences on
troop deployments, the proliferation of nontraditional missions, the drawWinter 2003-04
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“Just as the military’s isolation from society is
often overstated, differences in social attitudes,
while clearly present, do not place the military
outside the mainstream of American life.”

down, gender issues, budgeting for modernization, base closure and realignment, and a host of other important issues were overruled or watered down.
Some critics, most notably Andrew Bacevich, argue that President Clinton did
not control the military so much as he placated it: “The dirty little secret of
American civil-military relations, by no means unique to this [Clinton] administration, is that the commander-in-chief does not command the military establishment; he cajoles it, negotiates with it, and, as necessary, appeases it.”22 This
conclusion badly overreaches. Under President Clinton, military force structure was cut well below the levels recommended in General Powell’s Base
Force recommendations. US troops remained in Bosnia far beyond the limits
initially set by the President. Funding for modernization was consistently deferred to pay for contingency operations, many of which were opposed by the
Joint Chiefs. In these and many other instances, the civilian leadership enforced its decisions firmly on its military subordinates. On virtually every issue, the military chiefs made their case with conviction, but acquiesced loyally
and worked hard to implement the decisions of the political leadership.
As many scholars point out, the election of Bill Clinton in 1992 posed
perhaps the most severe test of civil-military relations since the JohnsonMcNamara era. Avowedly anti-military in his youth, Clinton came to office
with a background and political makeup that invited confrontation with the
military. His determination to open the military to gays, announced during the
campaign and reiterated during the transition, provoked widespread concerns among senior military leaders. Eminent historians Russell Weigley and
Richard Kohn have severely criticized the military’s role in this controversy,
and in particular General Powell’s actions. Weigley cites the episode as “a
serious breach of the constitutional principle of civilian control” justifying a
“grave accusation of improper conduct.” Kohn characterizes it hyperbolically
as “the most open manifestation of defiance and resistance by the American
military since the publication of the Newburgh address. . . . [N]othing like this
had ever occurred in American history.”23
10
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All this is poor history and even poorer political science. The presidential candidacies of Taylor, Scott, McClellan, Grant, Hancock, Wood,
and MacArthur while on active duty suggest far more serious challenges
to civilian control. The B36 controversy (the “Revolt of the Admirals”) in
1948 and the overt insubordination leading to the relief of MacArthur in
1952 represented direct challenges to the political survival of Secretary of
Defense Louis Johnson in the first case and President Truman himself in
the second. The “gays in the military” dispute was very different and much
less significant in overarching national security import. A more balanced
critique suggests that the controversy hardly warrants the claims made on
its behalf.

The Apolitical Soldier Revisited
The characterization of General Powell as a “politician in uniform”
is often contrasted with the ideal of the nonpartisan soldier modeled by
Huntington. This rigidly apolitical model, typified by figures like Grant,
Sherman, Pershing, and Marshall, colors much of the current debate. The history of civil-military relations in America, however, paints a different picture. Since the Revolution, military figures have played prominent political
roles right up to the present day. The ban on partisanship in electoral politics,
while real, is a relatively modern phenomenon. But the absence of the military from the politics of policy is, and always has been, largely a myth.
The roster of former general officers who later became President
shows a strong intersection between politics and military affairs. The list includes Washington (probably as professional a soldier as it was possible to be
in colonial America), Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, Grant, Hays, Garfield, and
Eisenhower. (Many others had varying degrees of military service, some
highly significant.)24 The list of prominent but unsuccessful presidential aspirants who were also military leaders includes Scott, Fremont, McClellan,
Hancock, Leonard Wood, Dewey, and MacArthur. Even in the modern era,
many senior military leaders have served in high political office, while many
others tried unsuccessfully to enter the political arena.25 Even some of the paladins of the apolitical ideal, such as Grant, Sherman, and Pershing, benefited
greatly from political patronage at the highest levels.26
In attempting to reconcile an obvious pattern of military involvement in American political life to the apolitical ideal, historians have sometimes differentiated between “professional” and “nonprofessional” soldiers.
The nonprofessionals, so the argument runs, can be excused for their political
activity on the grounds that they were at best part-timers whose partisan political behavior did not threaten the professional ethic. Yet many commanded
large bodies of troops and simultaneously embodied real political strength
Winter 2003-04
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and power.27 Indeed, for much of American history, the military was not recognizably professional at all. Before the Civil War, American military professionalism as we understand it today did not exist.28 The regular officer
corps was so small, so poorly educated, and so rife with partisan politics that
in time of war it was often led, not by long-service professionals, but essentially by political figures like Andrew Jackson. Even those few career soldiers who rose to the top in wartime, such as Zachary Taylor and Winfield
Scott, not infrequently became politicians who contended for the presidency
itself—Taylor successfully, and Scott notably not.
America fought the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil
War using the traditional model of a small professional army and a large volunteer force, mostly led by militia officers or social and political elites with
little or no military training—including many politicians (War Department
policy kept Regular officers in junior grades with Regular units; few escaped
to rise to high command).29 By war’s end, politicians in uniform like Butler,
McClernand, and Sickles and politically ambitious generals like McClellan
and Fremont had given way to more professionally oriented commanders. In
the postwar period the notion of the talented amateur on the battlefield faded
while the memory of the “political” generals, often acting in league with the
congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War to further their own personal interests, continued to rankle. Until the turn of the century the Army
would be run by professional veterans of the Civil War, particularly General
Sheridan as Commanding General, and they would attempt to impose a stern
ethic of political neutrality.30
That this ethic heavily influenced the professional officer corps cannot be doubted—and yet the tradition of career military figures seeking political office continued.31 Nor did the ethic renounce active participation in the
politics of military policy. Even at a time when the military-industrial complex was far less important than today, when the military share of the budget
was tiny and the political spoils emanating from the military inconsequential,
the military services struggled mightily with and against both the executive
and legislative branches in pursuit of their policy goals. In cases too numerous to count, the military services used the linkages of congressional oversight to advance their interests and preserve their equities against perceived
executive encroachment. Over time, a strong prohibition on military involvement in electoral politics evolved which remains powerfully in effect today.
But the realities of separated powers, as well as the powerful linkages between defense industries, congressional members and staff, and the military
services do not—and never have—allowed the military to stand aloof from
the bureaucratic and organizational pulling and hauling involved in the politics of policy.
12
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The Separatist vs. Fusionist Debate
There are essentially two competing views on the subject of the military’s proper role in the politics of policy. The first holds that the military officer is not equipped by background, training, or inclination to fully participate
in defense policymaking. In this view, mastering the profession of arms is so
demanding and time-consuming, and the military education system so limiting, that an understanding of the policy process is beyond the abilities of the
military professional.32
Military officers are ill prepared to contribute to high policy. Normal career
patterns do not look towards such a role; rather they are—and should be—designed to prepare officers for the competent command of forces in combat or at
least for the performance of the highly complex subsidiary tasks such command requires. . . . [M]ilitary officers should not delude themselves about their
capacity to master dissimilar and independently difficult disciplines.33
Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of
military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their
professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values.34

Aside from the question of competence, this “separatist” critique warns of the
tendency toward the militarization of foreign and defense policy should military officers be allowed to fully participate. Critics assert that given the predisposition toward bellicosity and authoritarianism cited by Huntington and
others, too much influence by the military might tend to skew the policy process to favor use of force when other, less direct approaches are called for.35
An alternative view, the “fusionist” or “soldier-statesman” view,
holds that direct participation by military leaders in defense policy is both
necessary and inevitable.
President Kennedy specifically urged—even ordered—the military, from the
Joint Chiefs right down to academy cadets, to eschew “narrow” definitions of
military competence and responsibilities, take into account political considerations in their military recommendations, and prepare themselves to take active
roles in the policy-making process.36

If the assumption of unique expertise is accurate, only the military
professional can provide the technical knowledge, informed by insight and experience, needed to support high-quality national security decisionmaking.
Given the certainty that military input is both needed and demanded by Congress as well as the executive branch, military advocacy cannot be avoided in
recommending and supporting some policy choices over others. This school
Winter 2003-04
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holds that long service in this environment, supplemented by professional
schooling in the tools and processes of national security, equips senior military
leaders to fulfill what is, after all, an inescapable function.
These two competing perspectives mirror the “realist” and “idealist” theories of politics and reflect the age-old division in political science between those who see reality “as it is” and those who see it “as it ought to be.”
As we have seen, the historical record is unequivocal. Military participation
in partisan politics has been inversely proportional to the growth of military
professionalism, declining as the professional ethic has matured. But the role
of the military in defense policymaking has endured from the beginning, increasing as the resources, complexity, and gravity which attend the field of
national security have grown. The soldier statesman has not just come into his
own. He has always been.

The Nature of Military Involvement
in Defense Policymaking
If this is true, to what extent is such participation dangerous? Does
active military involvement in defense policymaking actually threaten civilian control?
Clearly there have been individual instances where military leaders
crossed the line and behaved both unprofessionally and illegitimately with respect to proper subordination to civilian authority; the Revolt of the Admirals
and the MacArthur-Truman controversy already have been cited. The increasingly common tactic whereby anonymous senior military officials criticize
their civilian counterparts and superiors, even to the point of revealing privileged and even classified information, cannot be justified.
Yet civilian control remains very much alive and well. The many direct and indirect instruments of objective and subjective civilian control of
the military suggest that the true issue is not control—defined as the government’s ability to enforce its authority over the military—but rather political
freedom of action. In virtually every sphere, civilian control over the military
apparatus is decisive. All senior military officers serve at the pleasure of the
President and can be removed, and indeed retired, without cause. Congress
must approve all officer promotions and guards this prerogative jealously;
even lateral appointments at the three- and four-star levels must be approved
by the President and confirmed by Congress, and no officer at that level may
retire in grade without separate approval by both branches of government.
Operating budgets, the structure of military organizations, benefits, pay and
allowances, and even the minutia of official travel and office furniture are determined by civilians. The reality of civilian control is confirmed not only by
the many instances cited earlier where military recommendations were over14
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“The charge that the US military has become
dangerously politicized does not stand up
to closer scrutiny.”

ruled. Not infrequently, military chiefs have been removed or replaced by the
direct and indirect exercise of civilian authority.37
To be sure, the military as an institution enjoys some advantages. Large
and well-trained staffs, extended tenure, bureaucratic expertise, cross-cutting
relationships with industry, overt and covert relationships with congressional
supporters, and stability during lengthy transitions between administrations give
it a strong voice. But on the big issues of budget and force structure, social policy, and war and peace, the influence of senior military elites—absent powerful
congressional and media support—is more limited than is often recognized.
If this thesis is correct, the instrumentalities and the efficacy of civilian control are not really at issue. As I have suggested, political freedom of action is the nub of the problem. Hampered by constitutionally separated powers
which put the military in both the executive and legislative spheres, civilian
elites face a dilemma. They can force the military to do their bidding, but they
cannot always do so without paying a political price. Because society values
the importance of independent, nonpoliticized military counsel, a civilian who
publicly discounts that advice in an area presumed to require military expertise
runs significant political risks. The opposition party will surely exploit any
daylight between civilian and military leaders, particularly in wartime—hence
the discernible trend in the modern era away from the Curtis LeMays and
Arleigh Burkes of yesteryear who brought powerful heroic personas and public reputations into the civil-military relationship.
It is therefore clear that much of the criticism directed at “political”
soldiers is not completely genuine or authentic. Far from wanting politically
passive soldiers, political leaders in both the legislative and executive branches
consistently seek military affirmation and support for their programs and policies. The proof that truly apolitical soldiers are not really wanted is found in the
pressures forced upon military elites to publicly support the policy choices of
their civilian masters. A strict adherence to the apolitical model would require
civilian superiors to solicit professional military advice when needed, but not
to involve the military either in the decision process or in the “marketing” process needed to bring the policy to fruition.
Winter 2003-04
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The practice, however, is altogether different. The military position of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service chiefs, and the combatant
commanders is always helpful in determining policy outcomes. The pressures
visited upon military elites to support, or at least not publicly refute, the policy
preferences of their civilian masters, especially in the executive branch, can be
severe. Annually as part of the budget process, the service chiefs are called upon
to testify to Congress and give their professional opinions about policy decisions
affecting their service. Often they are encouraged to publicly differ with civilian
policy and program decisions they are known to privately question.38
This quandary, partly a function of the constitutional separation of
powers and partly due to party politics, drives the JCS Chairman and the chiefs
to middle ground. Not wanting to publicly expose differences with the Administration, yet bound by their confirmation commitments to render unvarnished
professional military opinions to Congress, military elites routinely find themselves on the horns of a dilemma. These experiences, the bread and butter of
military service at the highest levels, frequently produce exasperation and frustration. The consensus among civilian critics may be that the military dominates the policy process. But the view from the top of the military hierarchy is
something quite different.

Conclusion
For military officers working at the politico-military interface, the
problem of civil-military relations exists in its most acute form. There is, after
all, no real issue between the polity as a whole and the military as an institution. Across the country the armed forces are seen as organizations that work,
providing genuine opportunities for minorities, consistent success on the battlefield and in civil support operations here at home, and power and prestige
in support of American interests abroad. For most Americans the military’s
direct role in the interagency process and in the making of national security
policy is not only permissible, it is essential to informed governance and a
strong national defense.
The arguments advanced herein attempt to show that the dynamic tension which exists in civil-military relations today, while in many cases suboptimal and unpleasant, is far from dangerous. Deeply rooted in a uniquely
American system of separated powers, regulated by strong traditions of subordination to civilian authority, and enforced by a range of direct and indirect enforcement mechanisms, modern US civil-military relations remain sound,
enduring, and stable. The American people need fear no challenge to constitutional norms and institutions from a military which—however aggressive on
the battlefield—remains faithful to its oath of service. Not least of the Framer’s
achievements is the willing subordination of the soldiers of the state.
16
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